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ESSAY	“NEUTRAL”	GRAY	BRIEFS	
Z.	Payvand	Ahdout*	The	most	 significant	 foreign	 affairs	 cases	 that	 the	 Supreme	Court	has	decided—including,	among	others,	Youngstown	Sheet	&	
Tube	v.	Sawyer,1	United	States	v.	Curtiss-Wright,2	and	Zivotofsky	v.	
Kerry3—have	substantial	effects	at	home.	These	canonical	cases	fix	the	 boundaries	 of	 power	 between	 the	 coordinate	 branches	 of	government.	In	this	Essay,	the	Author	wants	to	start	a	discussion	that	 concerns	 one	 underexplored	 attribute	 of	 these	 cases:	Although	these	cases	adjudicate	authority	between	the	President	and	Congress,	they	are	litigated	between	the	Solicitor	General	and	private	parties.	The	Supreme	Court	is	limited	by	Article	III	of	the	Constitution	to	 resolving	 “Cases”	 or	 “Controversies.” 4 	When	 the	 Court	adjudicates	 foreign	 affairs	 issues,	 those	 issues	 are	 litigated	 as	opposed	 to	 negotiated,	 administered,	 or	 legislated.	 There	 is	 a	judicial	 record.	 There	 are	 briefs	 and	 arguments.	 And,	 critically,	there	are	parties.	Contrast	the	Judiciary’s	 limited	set	of	decision-making	tools	and	processes	with	the	other	branches’	much	broader	toolkits.	The	Executive	Branch	includes	the	State	Department	(and	its	 ambassadors	 and	 foreign	 liaisons)	 and	 numerous	 sources	 of	intelligence	 (including	 agencies	 housed	 within	 the	 Executive	Branch).	The	Executive	Branch	can	consult	with	foreign	heads	of	state	and	multinational	bodies.	And	it	can	include	new	intelligence	
 *	Academic	Fellow,	Columbia	Fellow,	Columbia	Law	School.	I	would	like	to	thank	the	Fordham	International	Law	Journal	for	the	invitation	to	participate	in	this	Symposium.	I	would	also	like	to	thank	Brian	Richardson	and	the	participants	in	the	A&F	Workshop	at	Columbia	Law	School.	1.	 343	U.S.	579,	634-55	 (1953)	 (Jackson,	 J.,	 concurring)	 (setting	 the	 framework	 to	adjudicate	power	disputes	between	President	and	Congress).	2.	 299	U.S.	304,	319	(1936)	(establishing	the	President	is	the	“sole	organ”	in	foreign	affairs).	3.	 576	U.S.	1059	(2015)	(holding	Congress	may	not	qualify	the	President’s	exclusive	recognition	power).	4.	 U.S.	CONST.	art.	III,	§	2,	cl.	1.	
1286	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	and	information	as	it	becomes	available.	Likewise,	the	Legislative	Branch	 has	 access	 to	 intelligence	 and	 oversight	 and	 its	decisionmakers	 can	 consult	 new	 evidence	 and	 keep	 up	 with	foreign	developments.	By	contrast,	courts—including	the	Supreme	Court—are	constrained	by	the	record	and	briefs	 that	 the	parties	put	before	them.	Here,	the	Author	would	like	to	probe	the	role	of	one	particular	party,	the	Solicitor	General:	the	officer	charged	with	representing	the	“United	States”	in	the	Court.5	Often	referred	to	as	the	“Tenth	Justice,”6	the	Solicitor	General	is	an	integrated	thread	in	the	Supreme	Court’s	fabric.	The	Solicitor	General	has	a	physical	presence—her	own	office—located	inside	the	Court.7	The	Court	will	often	call	for	the	Solicitor	General’s	views	at	 the	 certiorari	 stage	 and	 will	 permit	 the	 Solicitor	 General	 to	participate	at	oral	argument	as	the	most	frequent	amicus	curiae.8	Scholars	 have	written	 about	 the	 special	 status	 that	 the	 Solicitor	General	 enjoys. 9 	The	 Office’s	 success	 at	 the	 Court	 is	 well-documented	 and	 unmatched	 at	 both	 the	 certiorari	 and	 merits	stages.10	Some	attribute	this	high	degree	of	success	to	the	special	care	that	the	Solicitor	General	exercises	in	carrying	out	her	role.11	The	Office	employs	a	rigorous	vetting	process	before	choosing	to	petition	for	certiorari,	and	those	who	craft	the	briefs—the	Solicitor	
 5.	 See	28	U.S.C.	§	518(a)	(stating	“except	where	the	Attorney	General	in	a	particular	case	directs	otherwise,	the	Attorney	General	and	the	Solicitor	General	shall	conduct	and	argue	suits	and	appeals	in	the	Supreme	Court	.	.	.	in	which	the	United	States	is	interested.”).	The	 Attorney	 General,	 in	 turn,	 has	 delegated	 authority	 to	 the	 Solicitor	 General	 by	regulation.	See	28	C.F.R.	§	0.20.	
6.	 See	generally	LINCOLN	CAPLAN,	THE	TENTH	JUSTICE:	THE	SOLICITOR	GENERAL	AND	THE	RULE	OF	LAW	(1987).	7.	 It	 is	 quite	 remarkable	 for	 one	 branch	 to	 have	 a	 physical	 space	within	 another	branch	of	government.	Indeed,	the	only	other	is	the	Vice	President’s	office	in	the	Senate.	8.	 See	Dr.	Adam	Feldman,	Amicus	Oral	Argument	Participation	Over	Time,	EMPIRICAL	SCOTUS	 (Jan.	 4,	 2017),	 https://empiricalscotus.com/2017/01/04/amicus-oral-argument/	[https://perma.cc/UAH8-2KTU].	9.	 See	generally	REBECCA	MAE	SALOKAR,	THE	SOLICITOR	GENERAL:	THE	POLITICS	OF	LAW	(1992);	 Neal	 Devins,	 Unitariness	 and	 Independence:	 Solicitor	 General	 Control	 Over	
Independent	Agency	Litigation,	82	CAL.	L.	REV.	255,	260	(1994);	Jeffrey	A.	Segal,	Supreme	Court	Support	 for	 the	Solicitor	General:	The	Effect	of	Presidential	Appointments,	43	W.	POL.	Q.	137,	147-50	(1990).	10.	 See,	e.g.,	SALOKAR,	supra	note	9,	at	14-32	(collecting	data	at	certiorari	and	merits	stages).	11.	 Seth	P.	Waxman,	“Presenting	the	Case	of	 the	United	States	As	 It	Should	Be”:	The	
Solicitor	General	in	Historical	Context,	Address	to	the	Supreme	Court	Historical	Society,	U.S.	DEP’T	 OF	 JUST.	 (June	 1,	 1998),	 https://www.justice.gov/osg/about-office	[https://perma.cc/5UVQ-4Z57].	
2020]	 "NEUTRAL"	GRAY	BRIEFS	 1287	General,	 the	 Principal	 Deputy	 Solicitor	 General,	 three	 career	deputies,	and	sixteen	assistants—are	some	of	the	most	seasoned	Supreme	Court	litigators	in	the	country.12	Even	the	bindings	of	the	Solicitor	 General’s	 arguments	 set	 it	 apart	 from	 the	 pack.	 When	private	 parties	 file	 briefs	 they	 are	 either	 blue	 (petitioner),	 red	(respondent),	or	green	(amicus).13	The	Solicitor	General’s	brief	 is	always	gray.14	It	appears	to	be	literally	neutral.	The	Solicitor	General	is	not	neutral,	however.	It	represents	the	interests	 of	 the	 “United	 States.” 15 	Who	 or	 what	 is	 the	 “United	States”?	In	United	States	v.	Providence	Journal	the	Supreme	Court	answered	 precisely	 that	 question. 16 	In	 a	 case	 with	 a	 complex	procedural	posture,	a	special	prosecutor	representing	the	Judicial	Branch	 in	 a	 contempt	 proceeding	 sought	 permission	 from	 the	Solicitor	 General	 to	 petition	 for	 certiorari,	 which	 the	 Solicitor	General	 denied.17	Nonetheless,	 the	 special	 prosecutor	 petitioned	for	 certiorari	 and	 the	 Court	 decided	 the	 threshold	 question	 of	whether	the	special	prosecutor	was	permitted	to	bring	this	suit	in	light	of	the	fact	that	the	Solicitor	General	is	the	only	officer	who	can	litigate	 a	 case	 before	 the	 Court	 “in	 which	 the	 United	 States	 is	interested.” 18 	Although	 both	 the	 special	 prosecutor	 and	 the	Solicitor	 General	 argued	 that	 this	 was	 not	 a	 case	 “in	 which	 the	United	 States	 is	 interested,”	 the	 Court	 found	 that	 the	 Article	 III	judicial	power	at	stake	was	very	much	part	of	the	sovereign	United	States.19 	“It	 seems	 to	 be	 elementary	 that	 even	 when	 exercising	distinct	and	jealously	separated	powers,	the	three	branches	are	but	‘co-ordinate	 parts	 of	 one	 government[,]’”	 and	 so,	 the	 Solicitor	
 12.	 See	generally	Marc	Galanter,	Why	the	“Haves”	Come	Out	Ahead:	Speculations	on	the	
Limits	of	Legal	Change,	9	LAW	&	SOC’Y	REV.	95	(1974)	(theorizing	the	advantages	that	repeat	players	enjoy	in	litigation).	Indeed,	some	in	the	Office	have	argued	over	a	hundred	cases	before	the	Supreme	Court.	13.	 U.S.	 Supreme	 Court	 –	 Booklet	 Format	 Specification	 Chart,	 SUPREME	 COURT,		https://www.supremecourt.gov/casehand/USSC%20-%20Booklet-Format%20Specification%20Chart%202019.pdf	 [https://perma.cc/56AB-SH9U]	 (last	visited	May	1,	2020).	14.	 So	close	is	the	working	relationship	between	the	Solicitor	General’s	Office	and	the	Supreme	Court	that	the	Supreme	Court’s	chart	describing	to	parties	how	briefs	should	be	filed	does	not	even	include	directions	for	the	Solicitor	General’s	briefs.		See	id.	15.	 See	28	U.S.C.	§	518(a)	(providing	statutory	text	and	regulatory	provisions).	16.	 United	States	v.	Providence	Journal	Co.,	485	U.S.	693,	701	(1988).	17.	 Id.	at	698-99.	18.	 28	U.S.C.	§	518(a).	19.	 Providence	Journal,	485	U.S.	at	700-03.	
1288	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	General	 represents	 all	 of	 those	 interests,	 not	 just	 the	 Executive	Branch’s	interests.20	The	ubiquity	of	the	Solicitor	General’s	participation	in	public	law	 cases	 carries	 the	 specter	 of	 a	 distorting	 effect	 in	 the	development	of	public	law:	the	Solicitor	General	can	coordinate	its	positions	 over	 a	 long	 period	 of	 time,	 it	 can	 settle	 hard	 cases	 or	confess	 error	 in	 cases	 with	 bad	 facts,	 and	 it	 can	 help	 craft	 the	record	that	ultimately	comes	before	the	Court.21	But	the	potential	distorting	effect	of	its	participation	is	even	more	concerning	in	the	foreign	affairs	arena,	particularly	when	considered	together	with	doctrines	of	deference	 to	 executive	branch	expertise.22	Although	the	 Solicitor	 General	 aspires	 “to	 ensure	 that	 the	 United	 States	speaks	in	court	with	a	single	voice	–	a	voice	that	speaks	on	behalf	of	 the	 rule	 of	 law[,]”23	when	 there	 is	 an	 inter-branch	 conflict—often	 taking	 the	 form	 of	 the	 President	 versus	 Congress—the	Solicitor	 General	 almost	 always	 represents	 the	 President.	 For	example,	in	Youngstown	Sheet	and	Tube	v.	Sawyer—the	canonical	decision	 setting	 out	 an	 adjudicative	 framework	 for	 executive	power	in	foreign	affairs—Secretary	of	Commerce	Sawyer	(i.e.,	the	Executive	 Branch)	 was	 represented	 by	 the	 Solicitor	 General. 24	Congress’	 interest	 in	 its	statute,	by	contrast,	was	represented	by	the	private	petitioners,	Youngstown	Sheet	and	Tube,	and	others.25	One	of	the	modern	cases	concerning	the	relationship	between	Congress	 and	 the	 President	 in	 foreign	 affairs	 matters	 was	commenced	 by	 a	 private	 citizen.	 Menachim	 Zivotofsky	 is	 a	 US	citizen	 born	 in	 Jerusalem. 26 	In	 December	 2002,	 Zivotofsky’s	
 20.	 Id.	 at	 701	 (quoting	 J.W.	Hampton,	 Jr.	&	Co.	 v.	United	States,	 276	U.S.	 394,	 406	(1928)).	21.	 David	M.	Rosenzweig,	Confession	of	Error	 in	 the	Supreme	Court	by	 the	Solicitor	
General,	82	GEO.	L.J.	2079	(1993);	Neal	K.	Katyal,	The	Solicitor	General	and	Confession	of	
Error,	81	FORDHAM	L.	REV.	3027	(2013);	Z.	Payvand	Ahdout,	Direct	Collateral	Review,	121	COLUM.	L.	REV.	 (forthcoming)	 (chronicling	specific	examples	where	 the	Solicitor	General	coordinates	a	position	over	time	with	an	apparent	strategic	aim).	 	At	times,	it	 is	not	the	Solicitor	 General	 that	 directly	 controls	 these	 decisions,	 but	 other	 actors	 within	 the	Department	of	Justice	or	Executive	Branch.	22 .	 See,	 e.g.,	 Trump	 v.	 Hawaii,	 138	 S.	 Ct.	 2392	 (2018)	 (deferring	 to	 Executive’s	national	security	expertise).	23.	 See	Waxman,	supra	note	11.	24.	 Youngstown,	343	U.S.	at	581.	25.	 See	Brief	for	Plaintiff	Companies	at	18-26,	Youngstown	Sheet	&	Tube	v.	Sawyer,	343	U.S.	579	(1953)	(Nos.	744,	745),	1952	WL	82173	(arguing	that	Congress	provided	a	remedy	in	the	Labor	Management	Relations	Act	of	1947).	26.	 Zivotofsky	v.	Clinton,	566	U.S.	189,	192	(2012).	
2020]	 "NEUTRAL"	GRAY	BRIEFS	 1289	mother	filed	an	application	for	a	Consular	Report	of	Birth	Abroad	and	 sought	 to	 obtain	 a	 US	 Passport	 for	 Zivotofsky,	 listing	 his	birthplace	 as	 “Jerusalem,	 Israel.”27	Diplomatic	 officials	 informed	Zivotofsky’s	mother	that	State	Department	policy	required	them	to	record	 “Jerusalem”	 as	 the	 place	 of	 birth	 (without	 reference	 to	Israel). 28 	This	 State	 Department	 policy,	 ostensibly	 crafted	 to	navigate	 Middle	 East	 tensions,	 violated	 Congress’	 word	 in	 the	Foreign	Relations	Authorization	Act,	which	required	the	Secretary	of	 State	 to	 list	 the	 birthplace	 as	 “Israel”	 if	 so	 requested. 29	Zivotofsky’s	 parents	 thus	 initiated	 suit	 seeking	 an	 order	compelling	 the	 State	 Department	 to	 identify	 Zivotofsky’s	birthplace	 as	 “Jerusalem,	 Israel”	 pursuant	 to	 the	 Act. 30 	The	fundamental	question	presented	by	this	dispute	was	whether	the	Foreign	Relations	Authorization	Act	impermissibly	infringes	upon	the	 President’s	 power	 to	 recognize	 foreign	 states.	 Congress’	passport	power—not	enumerated,	but	historically	exercised—and	the	President’s	recognition	power—not	enumerated,	but	derived	from	the	authority	to	receive	foreign	officers—clashed.	The	first	time	the	suit	came	to	the	Court,	styled	Zivotofsky	v.	
Clinton,	 the	 primary	 question	 presented	 was	 whether	 the	 case	presented	 a	 non-justiciable	 political	 question.31 	The	 D.C.	 Circuit	below	relied	on	the	theory	that	because	the	Constitution	grants	the	President	 the	exclusive	authority	 to	recognize	 foreign	states,	 the	Judiciary	cannot	review	those	decisions.32	In	an	8-1	decision,	 the	Supreme	Court	reversed,	concluding	that	the	dispute	was	indeed	justiciable.	 The	 Court	 reasoned,	 in	 part,	 that	 although	 the	recognition	power	belongs	to	the	President	alone,	interpreting	the	scope	 of	 the	 recognition	 power—an	 exercise	 in	 constitutional	interpretation—does	not	belong	to	the	President	alone.33	
 27.	 Id.	at	192-93.	28.	 Id.	at	193.	29.	 See	Foreign	Relations	Authorization	Act,	Fiscal	Year	2003,	Pub.	L.	No.	107-228,	§	214(d),	116	Stat.	1350,	1366	(2002)	(mandating	“[f]or	purposes	of	the	registration	of	birth,	certification	of	nationality,	or	issuance	of	a	passport	of	a	United	States	citizen	born	in	the	city	of	Jerusalem,	the	Secretary	shall,	upon	the	request	of	the	citizen	or	the	citizen’s	legal	guardian,	record	he	birth	place	as	Israel”).	30.	 Zivotofsky,	566	U.S.	at	193.	31.	 Id.		32.	 Id.	at	193-94.	33.	 Id.	at	201.	
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Zivotofsky	v.	Kerry.34	Briefing	and	argument	centered	on	the	clash	between	Congress	and	the	President,	not	on	Zivotofsky’s	injury.35	The	opinion	hardly	mentions	Zivotofsky	other	than	to	evaluate	the	arguments	presented	 in	his	brief.	Curiously,	however,	 in	spite	of	the	fact	that	the	House	of	Representatives	and	the	Senate	each	filed	
amici	curiae	briefs,	the	Court	assessed	the	arguments	put	forth	in	
Zivotofsky’s	 brief,	 not	 those	 advanced	 by	 Congress.36	Ultimately,	the	Court	conceded	that	legal	precedents	did	not	resolve	the	scope	of	 the	 President’s	 Recognition	 Power.	 But	 the	 confluence	 of	precedent	 and	 historical	 practice—including	 historical	Congressional	 acquiesce—dictated	 the	 result.	 “[T]he	 exclusive	recognition	power	is	essential	to	the	conduct	of	Presidential	duties.	The	formal	act	of	recognition	is	an	executive	power	that	Congress	may	not	qualify.”37	
Zivotofsky	 highlights	 the	 asymmetry	 between	 the	 Executive	and	Legislative	Branches	in	foreign	affairs	cases	before	the	Court.	Although	the	suit	was	initiated	by	a	private	individual,	by	the	time	the	Court	decided	the	merits	of	the	dispute,	the	only	question	was	the	 appropriate	 division	 of	 authority	 between	Congress	 and	 the	President.38	Yet	Congress	has	no	formal	representative	before	the	Court.	 Each	house	 of	 Congress	 filed	 an	amicus	 brief,	 but	 neither	house	of	Congress	participated	at	oral	argument.39	By	contrast,	the	Solicitor	General	filed	a	merits	brief	and	argued	before	the	Court.40	
 34.	 Zivotofsky	v.	Kerry,	135	S.	Ct.	2076	(2015).			35.	 See	generally	Transcript	of	Oral	Argument,	Zivotofsky	v.	Clinton,	576	U.S.	1059	(2015)	(No.	10-699).	36.	 135	S.	Ct.	at	2103-04	(stating	 that	 the	sole	exception	 is	a	single	citation	to	 the	Congressional	 briefs	 in	 the	 section	 where	 the	 Court	 evaluates	 the	 Passport	 Power	arguments	in	Zivotofsky’s	brief).	37.	 Id.	at	2081-82.			38.	 Petition	for	Writ	of	Certiorari,	Zivotofsky	v.	Clinton,	576	U.S.	1059	(2015)	(No.	10-699)	(presenting	the	question	“Whether	a	federal	statute	that	directs	the	Secretary	of	State,	on	request,	to	record	the	birthplace	of	an	American	citizen	born	in	Jerusalem	as	born	in	 ‘Israel’	 on	 a	 Consular	 Report	 of	 Birth	 Abroad	 and	 on	 a	 United	 States	 passport	 is	unconstitutional	on	the	ground	that	the	statute	‘impermissibly	infringes	on	the	President’s	exercise	of	the	recognition	power	reposing	exclusively	in	him’”).	39.	 See	 Brief	 for	Members	 of	 the	 US	House	 of	 Representatives	 as	Amici	 Curiae	 in	Support	of	Petitioner,	Zivotofsky	v.	Kerry,	576	U.S.	1059	(2015)	(No.	13-628);	Brief	for	the	US	Senate	as	Amicus	Curiae	Supporting	Petitoner,	Zivotofsky	v.	Kerry,	576	U.S.	1059	(2015)	(No.	13-628).		40.	 See	Brief	for	the	Respondent,	Zivotofsky	v.	Kerry,	576	U.S.	1059	(2015)	(No.	13-628).	
2020]	 "NEUTRAL"	GRAY	BRIEFS	 1291	The	opinion	for	the	Court,	moreover,	chronicles	the	delicate	story	of	 Jerusalem’s	 status,	 relying	 principally	 on	 presidential	 actions	and	statements,	not	on	Congressional	action.41	In	 a	 case-or-controversy	 system	 where	 the	 adjudication	 of	separation-of-powers	 disputes	 are	 litigated	 between	 private	parties	and	the	Solicitor	General,	the	specter	of	distortion	is	real.	There	is	a	difference	between	participating	as	a	formal	party	and	availing	 oneself	 of	 other	 modes	 of	 participation.	 Of	 course,	Congress	and	its	members	have	the	opportunity	to	file	amici	curiae	briefs	with	 the	 Supreme	Court	 to	 advocate	 their	 views.	Without	unanimity	 among	 its	 members,	 however,	 Congressional	 amici	briefs	may	appear	partisan	and	 therefore	be	 less	 effective.	Even	where	Congress	is	unanimous—as	in	Zivotofksy—the	fact	that	the	Executive	 is	 a	 formal	 party	 allows	 it	 to	 enjoy	 a	 spectrum	 of	authority	and	autonomy	that	Congress	does	not.	The	Executive	can	settle	cases,	moot	issues,	and	thus	can	effectively	prevent	the	Court	from	 ruling	 in	 a	 particular	 case.	 It	 can	 also	 be	 strategic	 at	 the	certiorari	stage,	urging	the	Court	to	take	the	case	with	the	best	facts	or	the	best	law	for	the	Executive.	Most	fundamentally,	although	a	private	party	may	be	aligned	with	Congress	in	some	broad	sense,	that	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 a	 private	 party	 will	 advocate	 for	Congressional	 authority	 with	 the	 same	 zeal	 that	 the	 Solicitor	General	 does	 for	 Executive	 authority.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 private	party’s	 interest	 is	 aligned	with	Congress’	 is	merely	 incidental	 to	winning.	 Still	 further,	 the	parties	 themselves	are	 responsible	 for	creating	the	factual	and	legal	record	on	which	the	Supreme	Court	ultimately	rules.	Even	before	the	case	 is	 formally	 in	 the	Solicitor	General’s	 hands,	 the	 Department	 of	 Justice	 participates	 and	 can	coordinate	 with	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 Executive	 Branch	 to	 make	strategic	litigation	decisions.	Deciding	whether	authority	formally	belongs	to	the	President	or	Congress	may	come	down	to	whether	a	case	was	well	litigated	by	a	private	party.	For	instance,	a	private	party	may	 formally	waive,	or	more	 likely,	unintentionally	 forfeit	winning	legal	arguments	by	failing	to	make	them	below.42	When	 viewed	 through	 this	 lens,	 the	 decisions	 that	 set	 the	foundation	 for	 the	 separation	 of	 powers	 and	 balance	 of	 powers	among	 our	 coordinate	 branches	 of	 government—including	
 41.	 See	135	S.	Ct.	at	2081-83	(Part	I).	42.	 See,	e.g.,	Am.	Nat.	Bank	&	Trust	Co.	of	Chi.	v.	Haroco,	Inc.,	473	U.S.	606,	608	(1985)	(declining	to	resolve	argument	that	petitioners	failed	to	make	in	court	below).	
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Youngstown,	Curtiss-Wright,	 and	Zivotofsky—are	 litigated	 from	a	place	of	asymmetry.	The	Court	is	sensitive	to	this	asymmetry,	but	it	 is	sensitive	in	ad	hoc	ways.43	Where	Congress	has	filed	its	own	brief,	 the	 Court	 sometimes	 allows	 Congress	 to	 participate	 at	argument. 44 	At	 other	 times,	 Congressional	 amici	 do	 not	participate.45	There	is	further	reason	to	be	sensitive	to	this	asymmetry	at	the	present	moment.	In	the	domestic	sphere,	there	has	been	cause	to	 question	 the	 Solicitor	 General’s	 neutrality.	 Some	 have	 been	particularly	skeptical	of	arguments	made	by	the	Solicitor	General	before	the	Court	and	have	questioned	the	Solicitor	General’s	use	of	procedural	 mechanisms	 to	 circumvent	 ordinary	 review. 46 	The	Solicitor	General	has	 filed	an	unprecedented	number	of	motions	seeking	 Supreme	 Court	 review	 without	 traditional	 appellate	review.47 	“Claiming	 one	 emergency	 after	 another,	 the	 [Solicitor	General]	has	recently	sought	stays	in	an	unprecedented	number	of	cases	 .	 .	 .	 .” 48 	At	 least	 one	 justice	 has	 seen	 reason	 to	 be	 more	skeptical	of	the	Solicitor	General’s	claims	of	urgency.49	It	is	therefore	an	apt	moment	to	question	the	role	of	litigants	before	the	Court.	The	Author	would	like	to	close	by	laying	out	an	analytical	research	agenda	to	probe	the	role	of	the	Solicitor	General	in	 foreign	affairs	disputes	 that	go	 to	 the	 fundamental	division	of	
 43.	 In	the	context	of	the	Alien	Tort	Statute,	the	Court	was	particularly	skeptical	of	the	Solicitor	General	when	its	positions	changed	between	administrations.	See,	e.g.,	Transcript	of	Oral	Reargument	at	34,	Kiobel	v.	Royal	Dutch	Petroleum	Co.,	133	S.	Ct.	1659	(2012)	(No.	10-1491).	44.	 For	example,	when	the	Solicitor	General	declined	to	defend	the	Defense	Against	Marriage	Act,	the	Bipartisan	Legal	Advisory	Group	(“BLAG”)	of	the	United	States	House	of	Representatives	voted	to	intervene	in	the	suit	and	litigated	the	case	at	the	Supreme	Court	on	 Congress’	 behalf.	 	 BLAG	 participated	 at	 oral	 argument,	 yet	 there	 was	 a	 substantial	question	whether	the	Solicitor	General’s	decision	not	to	defend	the	statute	deprived	the	Court	of	jurisdiction.		See	generally	United	States	v.	Windsor,	570	U.S.	744	(2013).		Indeed,	in	assessing	the	prudential	considerations	that	went	to	Congress’	standing	in	the	case,	the	Court	considered	“the	extent	to	which	adversarial	presentation	of	the	issues	is	assured	by	the	participation	of	amici	curiae	prepared	to	defend	with	vigor	the	constitutionality	of	the	legislative	act.”	570	U.S.	at	760.	45.	 In	Zivotofsky	v.	Kerry,	576	U.S.	at	1059,	each	House	of	Congress	filed	an	amicus	brief,	yet	neither	House	of	Congress	participated	at	argument.	46.	 Stephen	I.	Vladeck,	The	Solicitor	General	and	the	Shadow	Docket,	133	HARV.	L.	REV.	123,	159	(2019).	47.	 Id.	at	132-52.	48.	 Wolf	v.	Cook	Cnty.,	140	S.	Ct.	681,	683	(2020)	(Sotomayor,	J.,	dissenting).	49.	 Id.	 (“And	with	 each	 successive	 application,	 of	 course,	 its	 cries	 of	 urgency	 ring	increasingly	hollow”).	
2020]	 "NEUTRAL"	GRAY	BRIEFS	 1293	authority	between	Congress	and	the	President.	Should	the	Solicitor	General	be	accorded	 inchoate	deference	and	 respect	 as	 a	 repeat	player	 in	 these	 disputes?	 How	 can	 the	 Court	 assess	 when	 the	Solicitor	General	represents	the	views	of	the	United	States	without	first	deciding	to	whom	the	authority	at	issue	belongs?	Should	the	Court	 formally	 welcome	 an	 advocate	 to	 represent	 the	Congressional	 interest	 in	 these	 disputes?	 Should	 Congress	statutorily	create	a	“Congressional	Solicitor	General”	to	represent	its	 interests	 before	 the	 Supreme	 Court?	 Would	 such	 an	 office	further	 entrench	 the	 Solicitor	 General’s	 representation	 of	 the	President	in	these	disputes?		Of	course,	these	will	raise	threshold	jurisdictional	questions	about	Congressional	standing	and	political	question	 doctrine,	which	 the	 Court	 has	 yet	 to	 resolve.50	But	 the	resolution	of	these	questions	may	affect	the	balance	of	authority	between	the	three	branches.																				
 50.	 For	 interesting	 assessments	 of	 these	 issues,	 see,	 e.g.,	 Vicki	 C.	 Jackson,	
Congressional	 Standing	 to	 Sue:	 The	 Role	 of	 Courts	 and	 Congress	 in	 U.S.	 Constitutional	
Democracy,	93	IND.	L.J.	845	(2018);	Tara	Leigh	Grove	&	Neal	Devins,	Congress’s	(Limited)	
Power	to	Represent	Itself	in	Court,	99	CORNELL	L.	REV.	571	(2014);	Jonathan	Remy	Nash,	A	
Functional	Theory	of	Congressional	Standing,	144	MICH.	L.	REV.	339	(2015).	
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